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Ideas of Robin Le Poidevin, by Text

[British, fl. 1996, Leeds University]

1998 Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense'
Intro p.2 15186 In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values
Intro p.2 15187 It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past
1 p.3 15188 If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense
1 n2 p.3 15189 Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position
2 p.4 15191 At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed
2 p.4 15190 Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil
2 p.5 15192 We share a common now, but not a common here
3 p.6 15193 The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis
5 p.8 15195 If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals
6 p.9 15196 God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems
7 p.10 15197 Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language
1998 Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense
1 (a) p.13 15198 In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past)
4 (b) p.33 15205 Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed
5 p.37 15206 It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time
5 p.41 15207 We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories
2001 Interview with Baggini and Stangroom
p.174 p.174 6866 It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death
p.174 p.174 6865 A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective
p.222 p.222 6867 Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world
2003 Travels in Four Dimensions
02 'Everything' p.27 22919 A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist
02 'without change' p.22 22917 Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length
03 'Lessons' p.36 22921 Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending
03 'Lessons' p.40 22922 We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist
03 'Redundancy' p.41 22923 Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths
03 'Search' p.45 22924 If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition
05 'beyond' p.93 22928 For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space
05 'Great' p.87 22927 The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity
05 'Limits' p.77 22925 The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present
05 'Limits' p.78 22926 In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive
08 'First' p.138 22937 If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers
08 'First' p.140 22938 To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real
08 'Mystery' p.122 22931 We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment
08 'Mystery' p.124 22932 We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world
08 'Mystery' p.125 22934 Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process'
08 'Second' p.141 22939 The B-series doesn't seem to allow change
08 'Second' p.142 22940 If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it?
09 'in present' p.156 22942 If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short
09 'in present' p.158 22944 The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants
09 'in present' p.158 22943 Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere
09 'Questions' p.147 22941 How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient?
09 'Zeno' p.161 22945 The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times
11 'Objections' p.195 22946 The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces
12 'Hidden' p.205 22947 An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later
12 'Seeds' p.219 22952 If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected?
12 'simultaneous' p.226 22953 Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect
12 'The mind's' p.217 22951 If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events
12 'Three' p.206 22948 There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time
12 'Three' p.211 22949 Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete
12 'Three' p.213 22950 If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable